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Plaintiffs/appellants (hereinafter "plaintiffs") reply to 
the brief of defendant/respondent (hereinafter "defendant") as 
follows: 
As discussed extensively in appellants7 prior brief, 
under the Condemarin and Berry cases, the "rational basis" standard 
of review is not sufficient in testing the constitutionality of 
either the two-year statute of limitations (as applied to minors) 
or the four-year statute of repose in the medical malpractice act 
because both statutes infringe rights protected by the open courts 
clause. The appropriate "intermediate standard of review" places 
the burden on defendant to show that: 
1. There was a medical malpractice insurance 
"crisis," and, if so, that it was caused by medical malpractice 
claims (not by investment losses of insurance companies); 
2. Denying minors the protection of the tolling 
statute actually helps in a substantial way to solve that crisis; 
and 
3. It is reasonable to attempt to solve a medical 
malpractice crisis by a measure so drastic as denying to some 
minors a remedy for their injuries. 
It is against this backdrop that respondent's brief and 
the following reply should be considered. 
1 
I. REPLY TO POINT I OF DEFENDANTS ARGUMENT REGARDING 
THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
A. The Perceived Medical Malpractice Insurance 
Crisis of the 19707s and The Enactment of 
Medical Malpractice Legislation. 
On pages 8-12 and 15-16 of defendant's brief, he asserts 
the following: 
a. Minors7 rights are being adequately protected in 
Utah even under the medical malpractice statute of limitations. 
b. Thirty malpractice claims are being filed in 
Utah each month. With approximately one-seventh of those being 
claims by minors, it means that 51 malpractice claims are being 
brought by minors each year. 
c. Minors are receiving increasingly greater damage 
recoveries in Utah for medical malpractice. 
d. There was a medical malpractice insurance crisis 
in Utah. 
e. That crisis is a "clear social and economic 
evil" that needs to be eliminated. 
f. Justification for the medical malpractice 
statute of limitations is found in the "express legislative 
findings regarding the mounting medical malpractice insurance 
crisis." 
g. If minors7 medical malpractice claims were 
tolled during minority under the general tolling statute, it would 
result in potential liability of health care providers for so long 
a period that it would be difficult for insurance companies to 
determine the extent of their exposure and to calculate premiums, 
2 
and many insurers would therefore withdraw from malpractice 
liability insurance markets. 
h. It is rational to conclude that taking away from 
minors the protection of the tolling statute would be helpful in 
"containing the malpractice insurance crisis" by "controlling 
malpractice insurance costs and ensuring continued health care 
services in this state." 
Plaintiffs' responses to those claims are as follows: 
1. Defendant cites no authority or source for the 
statement on page 8 of his brief that 30 malpractice claims are 
being filed (by adults and minors) in Utah each month. 
2. The 1990 federal census showed a total 
population in Utah of 1,722,850, with 1,095,406 of those persons 
being age 18 or over, leaving 627,444 persons under age 18. Minors 
in Utah therefore comprise 36.4% of the population, yet defendant 
assumes on page 8 of his brief that only one-seventh (14.3%) of 
medical malpractice claims in Utah are filed by minors. Suits by 
minors therefore represent a disproportionately small number of 
medical malpractice suits filed. (Plaintiffs request the court to 
take judicial notice of the census figures referred to above. A 
copy of the pertinent pages of the 1990 census is included in the 
Addendum.) 
For defendant's assumption that one-seventh of the 
medical malpractice claims involve minors, he cites Jenkins, 
California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal 
Protection Challenge, 52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 829, 960-61 (1979). What 
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Jenkins actually stated was that "statistics show that less than 
one-seventh of all medical malpractice claims filed are brought by 
or on behalf of individuals under the age of 20.." Id. at 960 
(emphasis added), citing U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, 
The Report of the Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice at 
12 app. (1973) . Thus the ratio of suits involving minors (persons 
under 18, not persons' under 2 0) would appear to be more on the 
order of one-eighth (12.5%). As to how many minors would have 
brought claims after the period of the new medical malpractice 
statute of limitations in California (which, like Utah's, took away 
the protection of the tolling statute) but before expiration of the 
traditional limitations period (where the statute was tolled during 
minority), Jenkins said it is impossible to determine, but that 
"extrapolation from the available statistics . . . arguable leads 
to the conclusion that the number of minors' claims in this 
category is small." Id. at 961. Accordingly, the statutory scheme 
singling out children is not justifiable. Not only are they the 
most innocent and helpless of all classes of the society and, 
therefore, the most deserving of the protection of the law, they 
bring a relatively small number of claims. Therefore, defendant is 
clearly unable to meet his burden to demonstrate that infringing on 
the rights of children to bring their claims will solve the alleged 
crisis or that it is a reasonable approach. This is particularly 
true in light of the allegation in the defendant's brief (page 8) 
that in 15 years there have been only four tardy medical 
malpractice claims asserted by minors. If this is true as 
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defendant has alleged, then there is no way that depriving four 
children of their claims could possibly be said to be a reasonable 
or effective way to solve the purported crisis. 
3. At the top of page 9 of defendant's brief, he states 
that "minors' medical malpractice claims are being both heard and 
vindicated in Utah courts with increasingly greater damage 
recoveries being awarded", but defendant cites no authority for 
that statement other than to refer to two large jury awards in 1984 
and 1983 (seven and eight years ago, respectively) , and one of 
those (Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P. 2d 832 (Utah 
1984)), was not even a medical malpractice case. It was an action 
against a pharmaceutical company for negligence in failing to 
adequately test a drug and to warn of its dangers. 
4. On page 10 of the defendant's brief, he refers to the 
"express legislative findings" regarding the medical malpractice 
insurance crisis. Those supposed "findings" are set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-2 as ostensibly justifying the various measures 
adopted by the legislature in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
(Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-1 through -16, sometimes called herein the 
"medical malpractice act") to reduce access to the courts and 
otherwise to restrict exposure of health care providers and their 
insurance carriers for malpractice. Similar medical malpractice 
acts were enacted in many states in the mid-1970,s (Utah's was 
enacted in 1976) as a result of lobbying efforts by politically 
powerful insurance and medical groups, who threatened drastic 
curtailments in the availability of health care if the legislatures 
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did not respond to their demands. (See Note, The 
Unconstitutionality of Medical Malpractice Statutes of Repose: 
Judicial Conscience vs. Legislative Will, 34 Vill. L. Rev. 397, 405 
(1989) ; Cunningham & Lane, Malpractice - The Illusory Crisis, 54 
Fla. Bar J., 114 (Feb. 1980). "Regardless of whether the underlying 
circumstances were truly severe, the perceptions of a panicked 
public as well as ferocious lobbying by the medical profession and 
insurance industry generated intense pressure on state legislatures 
to enact remedial [medical malpractice] legislation." Learner, 
Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compensation Schemes: A 
Constitutional "Quid Pro Quo" Analysis to Safeguard Individual 
Liberties, 18 Harv. J. on Legis., 143, 144 (1981). 
5. Some of the most common provisions included in these 
medical malpractice acts in the various states, in order to reduce 
medical malpractice exposure, were: (1) limiting either the amount 
of recovery by plaintiffs or the liability of health care 
providers; (2) shortening the statute of limitations period 
applicable to medical malpractice actions (including eliminating 
the protection of the general tolling statute for minors); (3) 
abrogating the collateral source rule in medical malpractice 
actions; (4) establishing medico-legal screening panel plans; and 
(5) establishing either compulsory or voluntary arbitration plans. 
Learner, 18 Harv. J. on Legis., supra at 14 6. 
6. The preambles of those medical malpractice acts 
typically refer, expressly or impliedly, to a medical malpractice 
crisis because of increasing numbers of claims and increasing 
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amounts of settlements and judgments. The information used by the 
insurance industry and medical profession in their lobbying efforts 
and the legislative "findings" based on that information have come 
under increasing attack in the years since those malpractice acts 
were enacted, and a number of courts have made their own 
independent evaluations of whether the legislative findings were 
justified. Note, 34 Vill. L. Rev., supra at 415; Cunningham & 
Lane, 54 Fla. Bar J., 114 (Feb. 1980); see cases cited on pages 16-
21 of plaintiffs/appellants7 initial brief. 
7. The so-called medical malpractice insurance crisis of 
the 1970's was actually caused in major part by the insurance 
companies having suffered heavy losses in their investments during 
that period and then raising malpractice insurance premiums to 
recoup those losses. See, e.g., McKay, Rethinking the Tort 
Liability System: A Report from the ABA Action Commission, 32 Vill. 
L. Rev. 1219-1221 (1987); Learner, 18 Harv. J. on Legis., supra at 
144; Aitken, Medical Malpractice: The Alleged "Crisis" in 
Perspective, Medical Malpractice, Feb. 1976, p. 90. 
An illustration is provided in one of the law review 
articles cited in defendant's brief. Argonaut Insurance Company 
threatened to cancel all its New York physicians7 policies on July 
1, 1975 after it was denied a rate increase of 196.8% in January 
1975, after having been granted an earlier rate hike of 93.5% in 
July 1974. Even though the president of Argonaut claimed his 
company lost $10 million in 1974 in medical malpractice costs, yet 
Argonaut actually collected $15 million in premiums in 1974 and 
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paid out only $250,000 in claims, enabling it to pay a $10,200,000 
dividend to its parent company, the conglomerate Teledyne 
Corporation,, In that same year Argonaut experienced a $90 million 
decrease in the value of its bond and stock portfolio. The average 
payout in 1974 for the industry as a whole was $750 per doctor, 
whereas the average premium collected per doctor was $3,500. Note, 
The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act: Legislative Surgery on 
Patients Rights. 10 Val. U. L. Rev. 303-305, notes 7 and 10 (1976). 
It was also the Argonaut Insurance Company that 
precipitated the crisis in California: 
The present crisis was triggered in the fall 
of 1974, when the Argonaut Insurance Company 
announced to the doctors of northern 
California that they were seeking a 380 per 
cent increase in premiums and ultimately 
intended to withdraw entirely from the field 
of medical malpractice insurance. 
Subsequently, other insurance companies 
announced proposed increases in premium rates 
and echoed the claim of the unprofitability in 
malpractice insurance. In the final analysis, 
it was Argonaut's abrupt increases coupled 
with the equally abrupt reaction by northern 
California physicians that led to the 1975 
impasse over malpractice coverage. Almost 
without questioning the validity of these rate 
increases, the medical profession lashed out 
at the legal profession, demanding radical 
changes in the existing compensatory system 
for medical malpractice. 
Aitken, Medical Malpractice: The Alleged "Crisis" in Perspective, 
Medical Malpractice, Feb. 1976, 90-91. That led to a doctors7 
strike, which nearly bankrupted numerous hospitals in the state of 
California and led to the hastily enacted medical malpractice act 
in California. Jd. at 91. 
8. Shortly before passage in the Utah House of 
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Representatives of the bill that became the Utah medical 
malpractice act (Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-1 through -16), 
Representative Matheson on the floor of the House made a motion to 
strike from the bill all the language which now appears in the 
first paragraph of § 78-14-2 after the first three words ("The 
legislature finds") and to strike the first 26 words of paragraph 
2 of § 78-14-2, ending with the word "system". In other words, he 
proposed to strike the legislative "findings" to the effect that 
medical malpractice claims had increased and had caused premiums to 
rise and had discouraged some health care providers from continuing 
to provide services, etc. 
Representative Matheson's reasons for moving to strike 
those "findings" were that, based on the information furnished to 
the legislature, including the report from the "interim study 
committee," those medical malpractice conditions, while they might 
then be occurring on a national level, and especially in 
California, were not occurring in Utah and that there had even been 
a decrease in medical malpractice claims in Utah. 
While Representative Matheson's motion to delete those 
supposed legislative findings was defeated, no one disputed those 
statements which he made on the floor of the House. 
(Representative Matheson's remarks are found on pages 10-13 of the 
Transcription of Discussion and Vote on January 30, 1976 in Utah 
House of Representatives on H.B. 35 - Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act, a copy of which is included in the Addendum hereto.) 
9. The "long tail of liability" (which supposedly made 
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it difficult for insurance companies to predict future liability 
and therefore difficult to calculate premiums) actually does not 
significantly affect premiums because 88% of all medical 
malpractice injuries which result in claims are reported within the 
first two years following injury, and 97% are reported within four 
years; the "long tail" effect is therefore minimal and predictable. 
Kenvon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961, 978 (Ariz. 1984), citing statistics 
contained in U.S. Department of Health, Education & Welfare, Pub. 
No. 73-88, Medical Malpractice: Report of the Secretary's Comm'n 
on Medical Malpractice. 254 (1973) ; Hayes v. Mercy Hosp. and 
Medical Center, 557 N.E.2d 873, 887-88 (111. 1990) (dissenting 
opinion). 
10. The amount by which medical malpractice legislation 
has reduced health care costs is so insignificant as to be 
irrelevant. Kenyon v. Hammer, supra at 977; Hayes v. Mercy Hosp. 
and Medical Center, supra at 890. 
11. With respect to insurance companies which withdrew 
from the medical malpractice insurance market, most of them were 
"marginal firms not fully committed to this line of insurance" and 
their withdrawal "reflected efficient market discipline. The gap 
left by their departure was filled by newly formed mutual insurance 
companies owned and operated by medical groups. These provider-
owned companies now hold a considerable share of the malpractice 
market." Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970's: 
A Retrospective, 49 Law and Contemporary Problems, No. 2, pp. 5, 8-
9, 19 (Spring 1986). 
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12. Notwithstanding all of the medical malpractice acts 
enacted in the 1970's, medical malpractice premiums have continued 
to rise, but despite the continued increase in premium costs, the 
ratio of such costs to doctors7 incomes has not changed 
substantially. Mominee v. Scherbarth, 503 N.E.2d 717, 725 (Ohio 
198 6) (concurring opinion), citing the American Medical 
Association's own surveys reported in Robinson, The Medical 
Malpractice Crisis of the 1970's: A Retrospective, 49 Law and 
Contemp. Probs., 5, 31 (Spring 1986). In addition, malpractice 
insurance premiums are not a financial burden to the health care 
consumer (the patient) because even with continued increases in 
premiums, malpractice insurance costs have remained at about 1% of 
total health care spending since 1976. Mominee, supra at 725, 
citing Bovbjerg, Koller & Zuckerman, Information on Malpractice: 
A Review of Imperical Research on Major Policy Issues, 49 Law and 
Contemp. Probs., 85, 93 (Spring 1986). 
13. There is a growing judicial sentiment that the 
medical malpractice insurance crisis of the 1970's was illusory and 
that the legislation enacted in response to it was ill-conceived 
and inappropriate. Note, 34 Vill. L. Rev., supra at 415; McKay, 32 
Vill. L. Rev., supra at 1220. To the extent that there has been or 
is a medical malpractice crisis, "the consensus of opinion among 
physicians, other health care providers, lawyers, lawmakers, and 
disinterested observers - to the extent that such a concensus 
exists - is that the high incidence of actual medical malpractice 
occurring throughout the country is the chief cause of the crisis." 
11 
Jenkins, California's Medical Iniurv Compensation Reform Act: An 
Equal Protection Challenge, 52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 829, 851 (1979), 
citing a number of authorities. 
14. On page 16 of defendant's brief he cites Redish, 
Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: 
Constitutional Implication. 55 Tex. L. Rev. 759 (1977). That 
Redish article has been referred to (see Haves v. Mercy Hosp. and 
Medical Center, 557 N.E.2d 873, 887-88 (111. 1990) (dissenting 
opinion)) as one which took the position that there was a medical 
malpractice crisis in the 1970's. But Redish prepared his article 
for (and it was funded by) the American Hospital Association (see 
footnote in Redish, supra at 759), and the year 1977, when that 
article was published,'was during the period when the medical and 
insurance industries were engaged in their lobbying efforts and 
state legislatures were responding by enacting medical malpractice 
tort reform acts. In that environment it is hard to imagine an 
article paid for by the American Hospital Association being 
anything but supportive of their drive for legislation to limit 
medical malpractice actions. 
On page 8 of defendant's brief he cites Jenkins, 
California's Medical Iniurv Compensation Reform Act, An Egual 
Protection Challenge, 52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 829 (1979), which was 
written four years after California hastily enacted its medical 
malpractice reform act as emergency legislation prompted by the 
"apparent crisis" in the medical malpractice insurance industry. 
Jenkins, supra at 831-32. As a prologue to his article, Jenkins 
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quotes the following: 
Mindful of the adage: Act in haste; regret in 
leisure, there is concern that this sudden 
revolution of our tort system may have long-
range effects which will change the lives of 
all citizens - physicians included - without 
any remedial effect on the curse which 
provoked the revolt - exorbitant insurance 
premiums. 
Id, at 831. Jenkins concludes that three provisions of the 
California act, including the statute of limitations as applied to 
minors, deny malpractice victims equal protection of the laws and 
should be held to be unconstitutional. 
Ironically, in the third law review article referred to 
by defendant (cited on page 11 of his brief) , Note, The Indiana 
Medical Malpractice Act: Legislative Surgery on Patients7 Rights, 
10 Valparaiso U. L. Rev. 303 (1976) (examining the Indiana medical 
malpractice act), the author also concludes that the provision 
which denies minors the benefit of the tolling statute "must be 
stricken as an arbitrarily drawn statute which denies minors equal 
protection of laws." Id. at 350. 
B. Plaintiffs7 Response to Other Matters 
Raised in Point I of Defendants 
Argument. 
On pages 7-8 of defendant's brief he states that because 
both Kevin and Patrick were not only minors but were also 
permanently mentally disabled, (and would therefore always need to 
rely on a guardian to pursue an action for their injuries), 
"striking the statute of limitations would not provide them any 
further remedy. They would still have to rely upon a guardian to 
bring an action on their behalf." It is true that Kevin and 
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Patrick would always need to have a guardian to bring an action for 
them, but it is obvious that the medical malpractice statute of 
limitations has taken away a remedy they otherwise would have. If 
the antitolling provisions of the statute were stricken, Kevin and 
Patrick would have the benefit of the tolling statute and would be 
able to proceed with their present action, whereas, with that 
statute being in place (including the provision that denies minors 
the protection of the tolling statute), defendant is claiming that 
Kevin and Patrick have no right to pursue their action. In 
addition, the medical malpractice statute of limitations also 
applies, by its terms, to minors who are not mentally disabled. 
Those minors, upon reaching the age of majority, would not have to 
continue to rely on a guardian but would be able to pursue a remedy 
in their own behalf (were it not for the medical malpractice 
statute of limitations) for their injuries. 
At the top of page 8 of defendant's brief, defendant 
represents that plaintiffs have suggested that Kevin and Patrick 
"were deprived [of their opportunity to bring an action] because no 
one could act for them . . . ." That is not what plaintiffs have 
suggested. Under the medical malpractice statute of limitations 
Kevin and Patrick were deprived of their remedy because nobody did 
act for them, within the time limited by the statute, (although 
someone did act well within the time normally available to minors 
in personal injury cases). The reasons why no one acted quickly to 
pursue a remedy on behalf of Kevin and Patrick for their injuries 
are apparent and understandable. Their natural father could not 
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cope with the fact of their severe mental and physical disabilities 
at their birth and became mentally incompetent himself, having to 
be committed to a mental hospital, and their mother, Marian J. 
Meehan, was thus left to bear the burden of caring for the two 
severely disabled infants. (R. 131-33 - Affidavit of Mrs. Meehan.) 
That that burden was a consuming one is illustrated by the video 
tape submitted to the trial court as Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit 
of Mrs. Meehan, which video tape accurately depicts the mental and 
physical condition of Patrick. (R. 131-33.) (That video tape will 
be transmitted to the Supreme Court as part of the record in this 
case.) 
Furthermore,.it was not until more than four years had 
elapsed from the time of their birth that the mother became aware 
that Kevin and Patrick's having been born prematurely could have 
been avoided (as well as the injuries they received) if she had 
received proper medical care. (R. 131-32.) 
In addition, experience and common sense teach that most 
people are naturally reluctant to sue somebody, especially their 
doctor. They try to cope with the problem. For many parents of 
children who are victims of medical malpractice, it is only when 
financial burdens become intolerable as a result of the injury or 
when the child is not able to be provided with the care he or she 
needs because of lack of funds, that the parents are driven to 
pursue the child's legal remedy in order to obtain financial help. 
Denying children the protection of the tolling statute can often 
thus penalize the child whose parent initially tries (and often 
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succeeds) in bearing the burden of the financial impact of the 
malpractice without resorting to litigation. The shortened 
statutory period can also undermine the intent of the legislation 
(curtailing medical malpractice cases) by influencing parents to 
bring suits quickly instead of waiting to see how the child does 
(and possibly never filing suit). See Jenkins, 52 S. Cal. L. Rev., 
supra at 961. A recent study by Harvard Medical Practice Study 
researchers concludes that only about 2% of patients injured by 
medical malpractice ever file suit against physicians or hospitals. 
In other words, of those with valid malpractice claims, 98% do not 
assert them. Not only does this study suggest that many childrens' 
parents will not assert claims on behalf of a child, even when they 
probably should but it also is strong evidence that there is no 
"malpractice crisis." Localio, Lawthers, Brennan, Laird, Hebert, 
Peterson, Newhouse, Weiler & Hiatt, Relation Between Malpractice 
Claims and Adverse Events Due to Negligence, 325 The New England J. 
of Medicine No. 4, p. 245 (July 25, 1991). 
Page 8 of defendant's brief states that if no limit is 
put on the time in which a guardian has to bring a claim on a 
minor's behalf, a mentally disabled person would have his entire 
life span to bring a claim relating to negligence at the time of 
birth." Under the general tolling statute (Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-
3 6) the guardian for a person who is both a minor and also mentally 
incompetent would have a time limit. He would have to bring the 
action within the statute of limitations period, but with that 
period commencing to run when the minor reaches the age of 
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majority. That is the rule that applies to actions generally, but 
the legislature has made medical malpractice actions an exception 
to that rule. The general tolling statute, which implements a 
policy of not cutting off a minor's right to a remedy before he has 
an opportunity to exercise his right, has not been deemed unfair to 
potential defendants, largely because the vast majority of actions 
are brought soon after the injury occurs. See paragraph 9 on page 
10 above. Furthermore, if in a specific case it is unfair, various 
equitable remedies are available. 
Finally, while defendant's "chamber of horrors" argument 
may have some appeal in theory, in reality tolling the running of 
the statute for minors has not been a problem. Plaintiffs are 
seeking no more rights than the rights minors have had in every 
other personal injury setting in this state for many, many years. 
Allowing children such rights has not proved to be a significant 
problem in other personal injury cases or even in medical 
malpractice cases prior to 1976. Accordingly, there is nothing 
suggesting that it would pose a significant problem to afford 
children the same rights to the tolling statute in medical 
malpractice cases now. In fact, due to the extensive and detailed 
record-keeping typical of the medical profession, having a medical 
claim brought after the passage of substantial time would, in all 
probability, create less of a problem than would a belated 
automobile accident claim, by a minor, something Utah law clearly 
permits. Medical malpractice cases tend to be very document 
oriented, while other personal injury cases, such as automobile 
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accidents, tend to be very eye-witness oriented. The memories of 
witnesses to an auto accident quickly fade, while documents do not. 
At the bottom of page 9 of defendants brief, he cites 
five cases from other jurisdictions in support of the statement 
that "the Constitution has never required special, separate 
treatment of minors." Those five cases are Vance v. Vance, 108 
U.S. 514, 521 (1888); Murray v. City of Milford, 380 F.2d 468, 473 
(2nd Cir. 1967); Maine Medical Center v. Cote, 577 A.2d 1173, 1177 
(Maine 1990); Shaw v. Zabel. 517 P.2d 1187, 1188 (Ore. 1974); and 
Lametta v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 92 A.2d 731, 733 (Conn. 
1952). 
In the Vance, Murray and Lametta cases the minors, in 
arguing that the statute of limitations should not apply to defeat 
their claims, (1) did not base their arguments upon the open courts 
clause nor upon any other provision of a state constitution (state 
constitutions are generally interpreted to give greater protection 
to the individual than does the federal constitution), (2) the 
cases were not medical malpractice cases, and (3) the cases did not 
involve the situation where one group of minors (those with medical 
malpractice claims) were singled out and denied the protection of 
a tolling statute in comparison with all other minors having other 
types of claims, who did receive that protection. Thus the equal 
protection issue was not present in those cases. 
In addition, in the Vance case the statute in question 
imposed upon an adult an affirmative duty to act for the minor 
(unlike a parent or other guardian who has no such legal duty to 
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bring an action for a minor injured by medical malpractice). 
The Shaw case cited by defendant was also not a medical 
malpractice case. It involved an Oregon statute of limitations 
that applied to all personal injury claims of minors (not just 
medical malpractice claims). In addition, no open courts clause 
was in issue in that case (as it is in the instant case), and the 
court applied only a "rational basis" standard of review in 
upholding the statute. 
The Maine Medical Center case cited by defendant is 
discussed on page 24 below. 
At the top of page 10 of defendant's brief he states: 
"Because minors have no special rights beyond others, removal of 
the exception of the Utah tolling statute, should not be viewed as 
an 'abrogation of a remedy or cause of action' within the meaning 
of the Berry open courts analysis." The response to that is as 
follows: 
First, under recent court decisions there has been an 
increasing awareness of the unfairness and injustice of using a 
statute of limitations to bar an injured person from exercising his 
legal remedy before he had any practical opportunity to do so. 
(See cases from other jurisdictions discussed on pages 16-21 of 
plaintiffs' initial brief. Cf. Myers v. McDonald, 635 P. 2d 84 (Utah 
1981), discussed on pages 24-26 of plaintiff's initial brief.) 
Under state constitutional provisions minors, speaking generally, 
may well have additional rights beyond adults with regard to 
statute of limitations issues. 
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Second, beyond the question of whether the legislature 
could constitutionally repeal the tolling statute with respect to 
all claims of minors, an equal protection issue clearly arises when 
it is not just minors generally that are being denied the benefit 
of the tolling statute, but only the limited class consisting of 
minors injured by medical malpractice. 
Third, in light of the history of the tolling statute it 
cannot reasonably be said that the legislature did not "abrogate a 
remedy" when it denied minors having medical malpractice claims the 
protection of the tolling statute. Minors in Utah have been 
protected since at least as early as 1872 from the running of 
statutes of limitations which would bar their claims for injuries 
during their minority. Plaintiffs' counsel was not able to locate 
Utah Laws 1872 in which that protection to minors is apparently 
provided at Ch. IV, §24, p. 23, but the Compiled Laws of Utah 1876, 
§1118, continues that protection in tha following language: 
If a person entitled to bring an action . . 
. be at the time the cause of action accrued . 
. . within the age of majority . . . the time 
of such disability shall not be deemed a part 
of the time limited for the commencement of 
the action. 
Therefore, for over a hundred years (and beginning before the Utah 
Constitution was adopted in 1896) children in Utah, under the 
circumstances of the minor plaintiffs in the instant case, were 
able to seek a legal remedy for injuries caused by medical 
malpractice, but as a result of the passage of the Utah medical 
malpractice act in 1976, minor plaintiffs under the facts of the 
instant case no longer have a right to pursue a legal remedy. It 
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therefore seems specious for defendant to argue that the medical 
malpractice act did not take away any legal rights from minors. 
On pages 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 21 and 23 of defendant's 
brief he cites Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, 635 P. 2d 30 
(Utah 1981), but that case did not involve the claim of a minor. 
It held only that the two year statute of limitations in the Utah 
medical malpractice act was not unconstitutional under equal 
protection principles as applied to claims by adults. Furthermore, 
the court in that case applied only a "rational basis" test in 
reviewing the constitutionality of the statute, and the later Utah 
case of Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989) 
(and the Utah cases of Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984), 
and Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 
1985) , on which the majority of the justices in the Condemarin case 
relied), make it clear that a higher standard of review than 
"rational basis" should be applied in addressing the 
constitutionality of the medical malpractice statute of limitations 
as applied to minors. 
On pages 9, 12, 14, 15, 17 and 24 of defendant's brief he 
cites Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F.Supp 152 (D. Utah 1984). In that 
case a critical threshold issue for the federal district court was 
whether to apply only a "rational basis" standard of review or one 
of "heightened scrutiny." The court (Judge Winder), relying in 
part on Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, 635 P. 2d 30 (Utah 1981) 
(discussed above), applied only the rational basis test, which, as 
stated in Condemarin. affords an "almost total deference" to the 
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legislative scheme. Condemarin, supra at 354. Again, in light of 
the Malanr Berry and Condemarin cases, supra (all decided since 
Judge Winder rendered his decision in that Haraett case), there 
would seem to be little question, in addressing the issue of the 
constitutionality of a statute which denies minors the benefit of 
the general tolling statute, that in Utah the "rational basis" test 
should be rejected in favor of an "intermediate standard of 
review." (The Harcrett case, was reversed on appeal. The appellate 
court decision is discussed on pages 29-30 below.) 
On page 17 of defendant's brief, he quotes from De Santis 
v. Yaw, 434 A.2d 1273 (Pa. Super. 1981). It is interesting that 
defendant would cite that case because the majority opinion was 
opposed to the view that defendant advocates in the instant case. 
The portion quoted by defendant on page 17 of his brief is not from 
the main opinion but from a concurring opinion that disagrees with 
the reasoning of the majority. In that case, the plaintiff, a 
minor, brought suit for injuries suffered in an automobile 
accident. The minor's suit was dismissed by the trial court 
because it was filed after the Pennsylvania two-year statute of 
limitations had run. On appeal to the Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania (an intermediate appellate court), the minor argued 
that the statute of limitations should be unconstitutional as 
applied to minors, the Superior Court noted that the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania had 30 years earlier held that infants are bound by 
statutes of limitations equally with adults; the Superior Court 
stated that it was "bound" to follow that earlier Pennsylvania 
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decision and therefore had no choice but to affirm the trial 
court's judgment dismissing the action. The court then stated: 
The decision is not a comfortable one, 
however, and it is our opinion that this 
question deserves serious reconsideration by 
the courts at this time. Recent advances in 
the laws regarding children's rights have made 
an automatic decision growing out of a 
tradition that viewed children as possessions 
completely unpalatable. 
De Santis, supra at 1275. The court then traced the development of 
minors7 rights from the early common law (which assumed that a 
father "owned" his child's chose in action and therefore had the 
prerogative of allowing that right to lapse) to the present day in 
which a child's own right to recover for his injuries is 
recognized. Thus it is now hard to sustain what "appears to be 
violation of a fundamental right: a chose in action as a form of 
personal property that without question now belongs to the injured 
child himself, and yet he is legally debarred from pursuing his 
claim." Id. at 1276. The Court concluded, "It is time to rethink 
the law in this area and seriously consider change." Id. at 1279. 
On page 17 of the defendant's brief, he cites Bellotti v. 
Baird. 443 U.S. 622 (1979), and Parham v. J.R. . 442 U.S. 584 
(1979). The Bellotti case held a Massachusetts statute 
unconstitutional for involving parents too much (and therefore 
imposing too great a restriction) on a minor's decision whether to 
obtain an abortion. The Parham case dealt with a Georgia statute 
which provided for the commitment of children to state mental 
hospitals upon the request of their parents. That statute was held 
to be constitutional but only because it required the 
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superintendent of the hospital, as a "neutral fact finder," to 
exercise his independent judgment as to the child's need for 
confinement. The parents were therefore not given unreviewable 
discretion to make that decision with regard to their child. Those 
cases are far afield from the facts and issues involved in the 
instant case, but, interestingly, both those cases are examples of 
situations where, the Supreme Court held, minors should not be 
bound by the decisions of their parents. To that extent those 
cases are consistent in principle with the notion that a minor 
should also not be bound by his or her parents' "decision" (made 
consciously or through oversight) not to bring an action in behalf 
of the minor within the limitations period, thereby (as defendant 
argues) taking away from the minor the right to seek redress for an 
injury. 
On pages 18-20 of defendant's brief he discusses the case 
of Maine Medical Center v. Cote, 577 A.2d 1173 (Maine 1990). In 
that case the court indulged in the presumption that the Maine 
medical malpractice statute of limitations was constitutional and 
adopted only the "rational basis" test in upholding the statute. 
As discussed in plaintiffs' initial brief, Condemarin v. University 
Hospital, supra, indicates that when the legislature creates a 
classification of persons and infringes their rights under the Utah 
open courts clause, the presumption of constitutionality is 
reversed, and the cursory "rational basis" standard of review is 
not sufficient. 
In support of that Maine Medical case, defendant, in 
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footnote 4 on page 2 0 of his brief, cites eight cases from five 
jurisdictions, but only one of those cases (Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner) 
involved an open courts clause in a state constitution, and all 
five of those jurisdictions employed only a "rational basis" 
standard in evaluating the constitutionality of the medical 
malpractice statute of limitations. For example, that Rohrabaugh 
case stated that "Rationality is . . . the standard by which to 
judge this classification. . . . The statute is therefore presumed 
constitutional, and the burden was on appellants below to negative 
every conceivable basis which might have supported the 
classification." Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner, 413 N.E.2d 891, 894 (Ind. 
1980) . 
One of those eight cases cited by defendant (Thomas v. 
Niemann, 397 So.2d 90, (Ala. 1981)) did not even deal with the 
constitutional issue involved in the instant case. In that Thomas 
case the "single issue" before the court was whether the Alabama 
Medical Liability Act enacted in 1975 was defective because it did 
not comply with the requirement in the Alabama constitution that 
(1) the subject of an act be clearly expressed in its title and (2) 
that an act not contain more than one subject. Id. at 91. 
Another one of those eight cases cited by defendant in 
footnote 4 on page 20 of his brief (Petri v. Smith, 453 A.2d 342 
(Pa. Super. 1982)) is -the same intermediate appellate court that 
decided the De Santis case (discussed on pages 22-23 above), and 
the court in Petri referred to the "comprehensive and scholarly 
opinion" in De Santis. "seriously questioning the rationale of 
25 
barring personal injury suits by minors on a statute of limitation 
basis . . . ." Id. at 348. The court in Petri indicated that De 
Santis "well expressed" the continued feelings of the court against 
a statute of limitations that hold minors accountable equally with 
adults, but that the court was obliged to follow the earlier 
Pennsylvania precedent (which De Santis identifies as the case of 
VonColln v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 80 A.2d 83 (Pa. 1951)) until 
that case is overruled. Petri v. Smithr supra at 348. 
On pages 20-21 of defendant's brief, he cites three 
federal cases dealing with the two-year statute of limitations in 
the federal torts claims act. Two of those cases (Robbins v. 
United States and Brown v. United States) did not even discuss the 
constitutional issues but dealt mainly with issues of statutory 
interpretation such as whether the statute was intended to be 
tolled by the plaintiff's minority, by misrepresentation and 
concealment by government doctors, by a plaintiff's not knowing 
about the negligence of a government doctor, etc. The third case 
(Pittman v. United States 341 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1965)) did involve 
a brief discussion of the constitutional issue with respect to the 
statute of limitations in the federal torts claims act running 
against minors. The court stated: 
[C]ounsel for appellant argues rather 
eloquently that the claim could not accrue 
until Mark [the minor] had a guardian ad litem 
appointed by the court to pursue his right or 
until he reached 21 years of age, because 
there was nothing he could do for himself. He 
says that a right without a remedy is no right 
at all and therefore no claim could have 
accrued. Such argument has considerable 
original merit and perhaps has been followed 
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in some areas of the law outside the Federal 
Tort Claims Act. But the trouble is that the 
case law has piled up against Mark. 
We think that the concept still adheres that 
the Federal Tort Claims Act was a waiver of 
government immunity. There are decisions that 
say that the act should be liberally 
construed. We think that may be true as to 
what injuries are within the Act. But as to 
time, one can see that the Congress was 
alarmed about stale claims when it passed the 
Act and provided that there should be only a 
period of one year during which an action 
could be brought. (This was later changed to 
two years.) 
Pittman, supra at 740-41. 
The Pittman case was decided under the federal 
constitution (which typically gives less protection than state 
constitutions), did not involve the constitutional protection of an 
open courts clause (because the federal constitution has no such 
clause), was inclined to adopt a restrictive interpretation of the 
statute of limitations because the Tort Claims Act was a waiver of 
governmental immunity, did not employ a standard of review higher 
than "rational basis" (if even that much), and did not involve the 
classification of minors with a certain type of claim being treated 
more restrictively than minors having other types of claims (thus 
raising an equal protection issue). 
II. REPLY TO POINT II OF DEFENDANTS ARGUMENT REGARDING 
THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF REPOSE 
On pages 22-23 of defendants brief he argues that in 
Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30 (Utah 1981) 
the Utah Supreme Court has already upheld the constitutionality of 
the medical malpractice statute of repose. However, Allen did not 
involve the statute of repose but dealt instead with the two-year 
medical malpractice statute of limitations (which is the more 
reasonable of the two provisions because it does not begin to run 
until the patient discovers the injury). Furthermore, the court in 
Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P. 2d 670, 683 (Utah 
1985) (as quoted on page 22 of defendant's brief) points out that 
in the Allen case "no issue was raised as to the constitutionality 
of the statute under [the open courts clause]." Other reasons why 
the Allen case is inapplicable to the instant case are set forth on 
page 21 above. 
On page 23 of defendant's brief, he represents 
plaintiffs' argument in this case to be that "there is really no 
difference between an equal protection and open courts analysis as 
applied to the instant case . . . ." Plaintiffs are not aware of 
any place where they have made that argument. What plaintiffs have 
maintained is that when a statute infringes on an important, 
substantive right protected by the open courts clause of the Utah 
constitution, then the "rational basis" standard of review often 
used under equal protection analysis is not adequate, and the court 
should, instead, adopt a higher standard of review as outlined in 
the Condemarin case. 
Utah is hardly alone in striking down statutes of repose. 
The Berry opinion cites a number of cases where statutes of repose 
with respect to products liability, medical malpractice, and 
architects and builders have been held to be unconstitutional by 
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the supreme courts of other states. (Berry, supra at 677-78.) 
Specifically with respect to medical malpractice statutes of 
repose, it has been observed that the trend of court decisions is 
to find such statutes unconstitutional under state (not federal) 
constitutional provisions involving guarantees of equal protection, 
due process and open courts. Note, The Unconstitutionality of 
Medical Malpractice Statutes of Repose: Judicial Conscience vs. 
Legislative Will, 34 Vill. L. Rev. 397-98, 409 (1989). Those state 
constitutional provisions may grant greater rights to citizens than 
does the federal constitution. Id. at 410. "This trend appears to 
have coincided with growing judicial sentiment that the medical 
malpractice insurance crisis of the 1970's was illusory, and that 
the legislation enacted in response to it was inappropriate" and 
that such legislation has little effect on the availability of 
affordable health care. Id. at 415, 418. 
III. REPLY TO POINT III OF DEFENDANTS ARGUMENT 
REGARDING WHETHER THE TWO-YEAR STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS, AS A MATTER OF STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION, APPLIES TO THE MINOR PLAINTIFFS. 
On pages 24-25 of defendant's brief, he relies on Hargett 
v. Limbera. 598 F.Supp 152 (D. Utah 1984) as authority for his 
argument that a mother bringing a medical malpractice action as 
guardian ad litem for her minor child should be considered the 
"plaintiff" (instead of the child) for purposes of the medical 
malpractice statute of limitations. That statute requires an 
action to be brought within two years after the "plaintiff or 
patient" discovers the injury. Plaintiffs response is as follows: 
1. As indicated above, the Harcrett case was reversed on 
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appeal. 801 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1986). The Tenth Circuit held 
that the "savings clause" in the medical malpractice statute of 
limitations permitted the plaintiff's action in that case to be 
filed within four years after the effective date of the 1979 
amendment to that statute. Because plaintiff's action was filed 
within that period, plaintiff was able to proceed with the action. 
The appellate court made it clear that it was expressing no opinion 
on other issues in the case, which it declared to be moot, 
including the issues of whether the mother's failure to bring the 
action within two years of the time when she discovered the 
"injury," should bar the child from filing suit and whether the 
medical malpractice limitations statute violates the United States 
and Utah Constitutions. 
2. If the "plaintiff" within the meaning of the medical 
malpractice statute of limitations were considered to be the 
guardian ad litem instead of the child, who is the real party in 
interest, it would exalt form over substance because plaintiffs' 
counsel could simply have appointed as guardian ad litem someone 
who is a "stranger" to the child, who had no prior knowledge of the 
child or of his injury or of its negligent cause. 
3. In the instant case the guardian ad litem is not the 
natural parent of the children. With respect to the claims of 
Kevin and Patrick, their mother, Marian Meehan, is neither the 
"plaintiff or patient," and it would be more straightforward to 
hold that in a medical malpractice suit for a minor child, the 
"plaintiff or patient" (within the meaning of the medical 
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malpractice statute of limitations) is the child. 
IV. CONCLUSION. 
Under the Condemarin and Berry cases, the "rational 
basis" standard of review is not sufficient in testing the 
constitutionality of either the two-year statute of limitations (as 
applied to minors) or the four-year statute of repose in the 
medical malpractice act because both statutes infringe rights 
protected by the open courts clause. The appropriate "intermediate 
standard of review" places the burden on defendant to show that: 
1. There was a medical malpractice insurance 
"crisis," and, if so, that it was caused by medical malpractice 
claims (not by investment losses of insurance companies); 
2. Denying minors the protection of the tolling 
statute actually helps in a substantial way to solve that crisis; 
and 
3. It is reasonable to attempt to solve a medical 
malpractice crisis by a measure so drastic as denying to some 
minors a remedy for their injuries. 
Defendant has failed to sustain his burden on any of 
those issues. 
Finally, depriving a very few children of the right to 
seek compensation, (which in cases like this one is essential just 
to cope with the financial burdens created by the injuries), as a 
method for making up for poor investments of insurance companies, 
increasing profits or reducing premiums, is not only repugnant to 
the Constitution, but to basic notions of fairness as well. 
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Furthermore, even if a true crisis existed, asking a few children 
to carry a vastly disproportionate share of the overall burden of 
a society-wide problem is neither an effective nor appropriate 
approach. If a crisis exists, it has been caused by adults and the 
burden of it should be.borne by adults. 
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